Chapanis quickly learned that the mistakes were being made by bomber pilots, flying a particular set of planes, and not by transport pilots. But that finding raised more questions: What was wrong with the bomber pilots? Were they under some kind of stress? Were they tired? Poorly trained? Poorly chosen? Champanis' answer came from investigating not pilot psychology, but the bombers' cockpits. In the bombers, the wheel controls and the flap controls were right next to each other, and they looked identical. In the transport planes, the two sets of controls looked very different. Chapanis' solution? He put a rubber wheel on the landing wheel lever so that pilots would not get confused about which lever to pull (ibid.).
In thinking about social problems and human behaviour, economists typically focus on incentives. If the goal is to reduce consumption of a product, the standard economic prescription is to raise its price. But the pilots had strong incentives, and the right ones. They did not want to crash their planes (and risk their lives). The underlying problem involved not incentives but the architecture of the cockpit (ibid.). What pilots chose was a product of that architecture. When the wheel controls and the flap controls were difficult to differentiate, pilots made a large number of serious mistakes. Behavioural scientists have spent a great deal of time studying people's mistakes. In some ways, the last forty years of behavioural science might be described as the systematic study of human error (Thaler 1994) . We know, for example, that people use certain heuristics in evaluating risks, and that these heuristics lead to blunders (Kahneman 2011) ; that people procrastinate and are prone to inertia; that people are especially averse to losses (ibid.); that they are vulnerable to framing effects; that people can suffer from both "present bias,"
focusing unduly on the short--term, and unrealistic optimism, leading them to fail to take precautions; and that people do not see certain aspects of products and activities because those aspects are "shrouded," in the sense that they are neither salient nor highly visible. There is, of course, much more (ibid.). All of these findings have important implications for environmental protection and the general idea of sustainability. Recently, however, behavioural scientists, behavioural economists, and behaviourally informed policy analysts have placed less emphasis on human error, and much more on the relationship between human behaviour and the social background-on analogues to the cockpit (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013) . When the wheel controls and the flap controls were close together and essentially identical, pilots were effectively nudged to err. Consumers operate in their own sorts of cockpits. If a grocery store puts unhealthy foods next to healthy ones and makes them look identical, many consumers will buy unhealthy foods by mistake. And if consumers cannot distinguish between energy--efficient products and energy--inefficient alternatives, they will err as well. They will err even more if energy--efficient products are hard to find, or if it is difficult for them to understand the economic and environmental benefits of energy--efficient products. Attention to the cockpit, or to choice architecture, opens up a wide range of options for policy design. For example, default rules can have a large impact on consumer behaviour (Sunstein and Reisch 2014) , and choice architects have a wide range of other tools by which to influence decisions (Johnson et al. 2012 ). In the environmental domain, as elsewhere, default rules tend to be particularly powerful.
But it would also be possible, for example, to emphasize social norms (Allcott and Rogers 2012) ; to provide purely factual information (Loewenstein et al. 2014) ; to offer warnings; to frame options in particular ways (Willis 2013) ; to make sure that certain items appear first or last (Hanks et al. 2013; Dayan and Bar--Hillel 2011; Wansink 2004) ; to require active choosing, perhaps on a frequent basis (Rebonato 2012) ; to provide the equivalent of "maps;" to offer frequent reminders; and to make certain variables or product characteristics highly salient.
The repertoire of choice--preserving interventions, or "nudges," is constantly expanding. Such approaches are receiving attention not only from the private sector but also from governments all over the world; not least because they offer the hope, and sometimes even the promise, of effective reforms that do not impose significant costs on consumers or taxpayers. As the articles in this issue suggest, 1 default rules can serve as especially important reforms. As the articles also suggest, a great deal remains to be done. We suggest that it is important to work along two quite different tracks. The first involves ethical issues; the second involves empirical questions. In many parts of the world, the idea of paternalism is not especially appealing, though of course there are significant differences among nations on this count (a point to which we will return). It is reasonable to ask: When, exactly, is it legitimate for a government to affect consumer behaviour? One possible answer, associated with John Stuart Mill, is that if consumers are not harming others, they should be able to make their own choices, and should not even be "nudged" (Glaeser 2006 ). Even if we accept this answer, we might insist that there is considerable room for behaviourally informed approaches whenever consumer choices affect other people-as they typically do when environmental issues are involved (Sunstein and Reisch 2014) . Suppose, for example, that a democratic government is concerned about air pollution, including emissions of greenhouse gases. In such cases, mandates have a legitimate place, as do economic incentives, but nonprice interventions, including behaviourally informed strategies, can have a significant impact (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010) . Indeed, behaviourally informed approaches might be even more effective, and even more cost--effective (ibid.). We might also wonder about the claim that behaviourally informed approaches are illegitimate even when harm to others is not involved. Suppose, for example, that fuel economy and energy efficiency rules could save consumers a great deal of money, and that consumers do not make ideal choices from the standpoint of their own welfare (Bubb and Pildes 2014 If so, mandates might themselves be justified on welfare grounds (Bubb and Pildes 2013; Conly 2013) . It follows that even welfare is the master concept, some behaviourally informed approaches might legitimately take the form of mandates or bans. The argument for nudges is stronger still, because they allow consumers to go their own way (Sunstein and Reisch 2014) . In some respects, they operate like a GPS, in the sense that they provide guidance that consumers can follow if they wish (Thaler and Tucker 2013) . To this point it might be added that some forms of nudging are essentially inevitable even if we have not acknowledged them. No cockpit lacks a design, and consumers are inevitably making choices against a background that nudges them in certain directions. In our view, this point can be counted as a decisive objection to those who reject nudging as such.
Having said that, we should agree that hard questions are easy to imagine, raising serious ethical issues from the standpoint of both welfare and autonomy.
When should consumers be asked to make active choices? When are defaults preferable to active choosing? When is purely factual information better than a default (or some other kind of nudge)? What are the limits on the use of social norms? When does nudging become manipulation? These questions receive attention in this issue-and they will deserve far more attention in the future. One way to make progress would be to focus directly on the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. If a particular approach would minimize the sum of those two sets of costs, there is a strong argument on its behalf. Suppose, for example, that a certain default rule would reduce the costs of decisions and also lead to results that are highly desirable from the standpoint of consumers themselves. If so, there is a strong argument for that default rule. We do not contend that an inquiry into decision costs and error costs exhausts the ethical questions, but it does provide helpful orientation, and perhaps it can help make some apparently intractable (and abstract) disputes more tractable (and less abstract). The empirical questions are at least equally pressing. Indeed, some of the ethical questions can and should be studied in empirical terms, by asking about people's considered judgments about those questions (Felsen et al. 2013; Loewenstein et al. 2014) . With respect to the effects of behaviourally informed interventions, social scientists and policymakers have learned a great deal over the last decades, especially with the benefit of randomized control trials (Banerjee and Duflo 2011) . Even with these advances, we believe that our understanding remains in its adolescence, and perhaps even in childhood.
When, for example, do disclosure policies actually affect consumers? On that question, the most substantial questions are unanswered, with some evidence that at least in some contexts, consumers are often not much affected, but that producers do alter their offerings (Loewenstein et al. 2014) . To what extent are consumers affected by environmental considerations, or by other factors that do not involve economic self--interest? With respect to savings behaviour, automatic enrollment has had an extremely significant impact, indeed a larger impact than substantial tax incentives (Chetty et al. 2012 The articles in this issue cast light on many of these questions. Our hope is that they might contribute to an improved design of the countless cockpits of modern societies. The seven papers offer both positive and more critical accounts of behaviourally informed regulation and its tools, as well as hands--on applications of behavioural findings to environmentally relevant consumer behaviour. Reflecting the different disciplines that are crucial to thoroughly developing and promoting research in the field of behavioural economics, policy, and law, our authors come from diverse disciplines such as environmental psychology, economic psychology, experimental economics, resource economics, decision sciences, and public policy as well as applied mathematics and consumer law. Michael Price sets out to investigate the difficult-and often untouched-question of longer--term impacts of behavioural nudges to achieve public policy objectives. In
In Informing versus Nudging in Environmental Policy

The Persistent Impacts of Norm--Based Messaging and Their Implications for Water
Conservation they report on a randomized experimental design with over 100,000
households in which they study the longer--term impacts of a one--time behavioural nudge that aims to induce voluntary reductions in water use during a drought.
Combining technical information, moral suasion, and social comparisons, the nudge has a surprisingly persistent effect. Although its effect size declines by almost 50% after one year, it remains detectable and policy--relevant even six years later.
Further analysis suggests that the intervention works through both short--lived behavioural adjustments and longer--lived adjustments to habits or physical capital.
Treatment effects are not detectable in homes from which the treated consumers have moved, which provides suggestive evidence that these longer--lived adjustments are mobile rather than incorporated into the housing stock. Also, the persistence of the effect makes the intervention more cost--effective than previously assumed (cost drops by almost 60%). Nevertheless, water utilities may find this persistence undesirable if the nudges are intended to have only a short--run effect on demand during environmental emergencies.
The final contribution of this special issue comes from an author with a background in law. Kai Purnhagen from the Dutch University of Wageningen focuses on the precautionary principle, a key approach of European regulation. In The
Behavioural Law and Economics of the Precautionary Principle in the EU and Its
Impact on Internal Market Regulation, Purnhagen argues that the precautionary principle contributes to "the social aspect" of internal market regulation as it counterbalances the loss aversion and availability bias of regulators who may too hastily endorse measures based on furthering fundamental freedoms instead of fundamental rights and environmental protection. According to the author, the precautionary principle also enhances the regulatory power of the European Union:
By way of regulating via the precautionary principle, EU institutions pretend to have answers to citizens' fears. These fears result from a crisis of causality, as society is trying to find a meaning to what sometimes appears as a series of patternless events. In essence, Purnhagen claims that the EU legal order takes advantage of these effects and creates an image of being able to cope with these fears-but also that it may be questioned whether the legal order is living up to these expectations.
We are hopeful that the various essays might contribute to both theory and practice in these important domains. We are most grateful to our supportive reviewers, who have contributed in reviewing about two dozen submissions for this special issue.
